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The Vicious Cycle of Stereotyping: 
Muslims in Europe and Australia 
Mario Peucker and Shahram Akbarzadeh 
Introduction 
Large-scale immigration has resulted in fundamental and ongoing 
changes in the religious make-up of Western societies. In Europe, 
Islam has become the second-largest faith group after Christian affil-
iations with currently some five million Muslims in France (mainly 
from North Africa), about four million in Germany (mainly from 
Turkey), one million Muslims primarily from Turkey and Morocco in 
the Netherlands and almost three million mainly South-Asian 
Muslims in the UK. 1 According to the 2006 Australian Census, 340 000 
Muslims live in Australia, which makes Islam the second-largest non-
Christian minority religion in Australia, surpassed only by Buddhist 
groups.2 
For decades this immigration-induced diversification of the 
religious landscape and the increasing visibility of Muslim life in 
public spaces did not play a particularly important role in the debate 
on integration in most countries. Inclusion of migrants was rather 
religion-blind, guided by more general questions, such as to how to 
manage ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity. This blind spot 
began to diminish in the late 1980s, when the Rushdie affair in the 
UK and France's 1989 A/faire du Foulard, triggered by the expulsion 
of three Muslim girls from school for wearing headscarves, stirred 
heated political debates on the place of Islam in non-Muslim socie-
ties, which soon became a topic also in other parts of the Western 
world.3 
Since then, issues related to Islam have continuously moved up 
on the political agendas in Western societies and into the radar of the 
media, reaching an unprecedented level of attention in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks on September 11 and subsequent bombings in 
Bali (2002), Madrid (2004) and London (2005). This rise in public and 
political attention has been further spurred over the past decade by 
other-often violent-incidents associated with Islam, such as the 
murder of the Islam-critical filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the 
Netherlands, cases of 'honour killings' in several countries, or the 
Danish cartoon controversy. Today the situation of Muslims in 
Western societies and the potential global threat of radicalised Islam 
have become prominent features in domestic and international poli-
tics and public discourses. On the one hand, radical Islam is regarded 
as the new embodiment of both a global and domestic threat, which 
requires some form of 'securitisation' at the state level as well as 
through inter-state cooperation.4 On the other hand, states have 
come to recognise the need for 'religious governance5' to ensure the 
accommodation of Muslim communities and to promote social 
cohesion in religiously diverse societies ('domestication'), also by 
addressing exclusion and alienation of Muslims, seen as major 
factors in the radicalisation of Islam.6 While the government 
responses bear some cross-national convergences, they also reflect 
country-specific modes of managing cultural and ethnic diversity 
and understandings of nationhood. Consequently, significant differ-
ences between countries prevail-ranging from France's 
assimilationist, republican, lai"cite approach to the British under-
standing of 'toleration liberalism7', plurality and the promotion of 
race equality. 
Regardless of the divergent national regimes of religious govern-
ance and inclusion, hardly any Western society with a significant 
Muslim population has been spared anti-Muslim incidents (for 
example, vandalism against mosques and assault on Muslims8), local 
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anti-Mosque movements or the emergence of political parties with 
xenophobic and Islamophobic agendas (for example, Switzerland 
and the Netherlands). No government or society can claim to hold 
the ultimate key for a successful accommodation and social integra-
tion of Muslim migrants and their descendents. This assessment has 
been vividly underscored by civil unrests caused by outbursts of frus-
tration of socially marginalised (predominantly Muslim) youth, for 
instance, in Northern English cities in 2001, in the outskirts of French 
cities in 2005 and 2007 and at Cronulla Beach in Sydney in 2005. 
The diagnoses of the current social situation and public depic-
tions of Muslims in European societies and Australia also bear strong 
resemblances: Muslims occupy on average disadvantageous socio-
economic positions; many experience social marginalisation and 
exclusion from mainstream society; many feel under permanent 
scrutiny and are confronted with anti-Muslim stereotypes in the 
public and political discourse. The Issues Deliberation Australia 
(IDA) research project Muslims and Non-Muslims in Australia 
summarised this diagnosis as follows: 
Misperceptions and lack of understanding fuel a mutually 
reinforcing negative spiral: fear of the 'other' and aggres-
sive behaviour feed stereotypes on both sides, generating 
further negative behaviour, which may work as self-
fulfilling prophesies. Young Australian Muslims are becom-
ing increasingly alienated because of the near relentless 
questioning of their 'Australian-ness'. In searching for their 
identity, they turn to others who share this experience, 
and therefore gravitate away from mainstream Australia 
culture that appears to reject them. 9 
This vicious cycle10 occurs not only in Australia, but in many 
Western societies, and it involves an array of complex psychological 
mechanisms and multi-faceted social phenomena, which have not 
been fully disclosed yet by empirical research. The aim of this chapter 
is to shed empirical light on selected aspects of this vicious cycle in 
Europe and Australia. The first section illustrates the public image of 
Islam and Muslims in different countries using quantitative data 
from (European) cross-national and (Australian) national surveys. In 
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section 2, research findings are presented to describe Muslims' indi-
vidual experiences of discrimination. This is followed by a discussion 
of research on the ramifications of such experiences of exclusion, 
which suggests an association between discrimination, alienation, 
self-segregation and deviant behaviour with tendencies to anti-
democratic attitudes, violence and radicalisation (section 3). This 
chapter concludes with a discussion on what remedies multicultur-
alism may have to offer in order to break this vicious cycle of 
stereotyping, exclusion and alienation and to foster a culturally and 
religiously diverse, cohesive society. 
I. Public Attitudes towards Islam and Muslims 
In most Western societies the public image of Islam and Muslims has 
deteriorated after September 11 11 and, today more than ever, it 
appears to be characterised by two intertwined notions. Firstly, Islam 
is often regarded as a monolithic religion with fanatical and misogy-
nistic elements, thus incompatible with Western values, representing 
a potential threat to national security and to the fabric of liberal soci-
eties. Secondly, Muslims are accused of being unwilling 
to adapt to the societies' way of life and of lacking loyalty to the 
country they live in. Findings from attitudinal surveys empirically 
prove such negative stereotypical views in Australia and European 
societies-with sometimes significant country-specific differences, 
but also surprising resemblances, as the following paragraphs will 
illustrate. 
'Too many Muslim immigrants' 
A cross-country comparative survey on group-focused enmity (GFE} 
in Europe, carried out in 2009 by the Institute for Interdisciplinary 
Research on Conflicts and Violence at the University of Bielefeld 
(Germany12), revealed that on average 44 per cent of the respondents 
in the eight European countries under analysis were of the opinion 
that 'there are too many Muslims' in their country. While in France, 
the country with the highest proportion of Muslims, 'only' 36 per 
cent agreed with this statement, the highest agreement was found in 
countries with very small Muslim populations (Table 1}. 
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Table 1: 'There are too many Muslims in the country' (Agreement, in%) 
'Too many Muslims in Estimated proportion of 
[country]' Muslim population1 
Hungary 60.7 0.3 
Italy 49.7 2.6 
Poland 47.1 0.6 
Germany 46.1 5.0 
UK 44.7 4.6 
Netherlands 41.6 5.5 
France 36.2 7.5 
Portugal 27.l 0.6 
Source: University of Bielefeld European Conditions. Findings of a Study on Group-
focused Enmity in Europe, University of Bielefeld: Berlin, 2009, accessed 1March2011, 
http://www. uni-bielefeld. delikglzick/Press%20release%2013Nov _english.pdf; 1 Pew Research 
Center, The Future Global Muslim Population. Projections for 2010-2030, Pew Research 
Center: Washington D.C., 2011, pp. 161-2. 
The question as to whether there are too many Muslims in one's 
home country has not been posed in Australian surveys, but the 2001 
Australian Electoral Study (AES) asked about the preferred types of 
future immigration, which offers similar insights: 53 per cent of the 
respondents would like to see less immigration from the Middle East, 
whereas only 14 and 15 per cent respectively called for less immigra-
tion from the UK or Southern Europe.13 The 2010 Scanlon Social 
Cohesion survey also showed that negative sentiments towards 
immigrants from the Arabic world-one in five respondents 
expressed such unfavourable attitudes-are more widespread than 
towards immigrants from other parts of the world, such as Europe 
( 4 per cent) or Asia ( 12 per cent) .14 Similarly, the IDA survey, 
conducted in 2007, discovered a preference for immigration from 
Europe and a sceptical attitude towards migrants from the Middle 
East and more specifically towards Muslim immigration (Table 2). 
Not only immigration from Muslim or Arabic regions is 
perceived with a higher level of scepticism among mainstream socie-
ties in the West, but the general attitudes towards Muslims as a 
minority group are also significantly more negative than towards 
other religious or ethnic minorities. 
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Table 2: Immigrants Allowed into Australia (Agreement, in%) 
Should be Should Should be 
increased remain the decreased 
same 
Overall immigration 23 43 29 
Asian immigration 15 56 23 
Middle Eastern immigration 13 42 38 
Muslim immigration 12 42 40 
European immigration 28 55 12 
Source: Issues Deliberation Australia (IDA), Australia Deliberates: Muslims and 
Non-Muslims in Australia, IDA: Glenelg. 2007, p. 94. 
General Attitudes towards Muslims 
According to the European research study Religion and Politics, coor-
dinated by the University of Muenster (Germany), the general 
attitude towards Muslims is significantly more negative in all 
surveyed countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Portugal and the 
Netherlands) than towards Hindus, Buddhists and Jews. 15 Negative 
sentiments towards Muslims are particularly widespread among 
German respondents (around 60 per cent). In the other countries 
covered by the survey, negative attitudes were expressed by slightly 
more than one-third (34 per cent in Portugal, 37 per cent in France). 
The 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Survey also showed that only a 
minority of Germans (36 per cent) holds positive views on Muslims 
as compared with the Spanish respondents who were even less 
favourable (29 per cent). In France and the UK, the majority of 
respondents (65 and 63 per cent) expressed positive general opinions 
of Muslims. 16 
The Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2009 asked the same 
question about personal attitudes towards members of different reli-
gious groups. In Australia, like in Europe, Muslims are viewed much 
more negatively than other religious groups, and the percentage of 
those with negative attitudes is, similar to many European countries, 
above one-third (37 per cent). 17 The 2010 Scanlon Social Cohesion 
survey also found substantially more negative attitudes towards 
Muslims than to other religious group, though to a lower degree (24 
per cent) .18 
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The recently published findings of the large-scale Challenging 
Racism project, coordinated by the University of Western Sydney, 
provide empirical evidence on the high level of anti-Muslim concerns 
in Australia. The results of eight individual surveys, conducted across 
all Australian states and territories (total N: 12 512) between 2001 
and 2008, disclosed that anti-Muslim concerns were significantly 
more often expressed across the country than negative feelings 
towards other ethnic, racial or religious minority groups (Figure 1). 19 
On average, nearly half of the respondents stated negative feelings 
towards Muslims. 20 
Figure 1: Attitudes towards Selected Minority Groups ('Out-groups') in% 
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Source: Data used in the figure stem from: University of Western Sydney, Challenging 
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Western Sydney: Sydney, 2008. http://www.uws.edu.au!_ datalassetslpdf_file/0020142185/ 
State_ level_comparisonJor_ 4Rs_conference.pdf (viewed 1March2011). 
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Fanatical, Misogynistic and thus Incompatible with 'Our' Way of Life 
As several attitude surveys have shown, Islam is often associated with 
fanatical tendencies. The Pew Research Center found that eight in 
ten Spanish (83 per cent) and German respondents (78 per cent) 
associated Muslims with fanaticism, with lower but still significant 
agreement in France (SO per cent) and Great Britain (48 per cent).21 
Another dominant feature in the public image of Islam is the alleged 
lack of equal treatment of women. According to several attitudinal 
surveys in Europe, some 80 per cent of (non-Muslim) respondents in 
Western countries like Spain, Germany22, Denmark and the 
Netherlands consider Muslims disrespectful of women or associated 
Islam with discrimination against women (Table 3). These findings 
show country-specific differences indicating that Islam is less often 
associated with negative traits in France and in some regards also in 
the UK and more often in Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. 
Table 3: 'What do you think of when you hear the word "lslam"1' (in%) 
Discrimination Fanaticism Proneness to Narrow-
against women violence mindedness 
France 68 41 21 28 
Portugal 60 54 39 43 
Denmark 86 69 56 69 
Germany I East 81 71 67 53 
Germany /West 82 73 61 53 
Netherlands 80 75 67 58 
Source: University of Muenster, Germans Are Much Less Tolerant of Muslims, University 
of Muenster: Muenster, 2010. http://www.uni-muenster.de/Religion-und-Politiklenl 
aktuelles/2010/dez/PM_Studie_Religioese_ Vieifalt_in_Europa.html (viewed 1March2011). 
Islam is often perceived as a monolithic religion, incompatible 
with Western values. This viewpoint applies to European countries 
(though to varying degrees) as well as to Australia. The Religion and 
Politics study showed that only a minority of respondents in all 
surveyed countries-between 22 per cent in Germany and 37 per 
cent in Portugal-think that 'Islam does fit into our Western world'. 
On a more general note, a majority of respondents (some 70 per cent 
in Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, 59 per cent in France) is 
convinced that increasing religious diversity causes social conflicts. 23 
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According to the 2006 Pew Global Attitude study, majorities in many 
European countries believe there is 'a natural conflict between being 
a devout Muslim and living in a modern society'. This view is particu-
larly widespread in Germany (70 per cent), but also in Spain (58 per 
cent) and the UK (54 per cent), whereas only 26 per cent of French 
respondents assume such a conflict. 24 
The results of two large-scale surveys (N: 5056), carried out in 
Queensland and NSW in late 200 I within the scope of the aforemen-
tioned Challenging Racism project, did not only underscore the 
'outsider status of Muslims, as well as Australians of Middle Eastern 
... origin25 ' (see also Figure 1), but also suggested that misogyny-
related arguments are core elements of these negative attitudes 
towards Muslims: only 46 per cent of the respondents would not be 
concerned if a close relative were to marry a Muslim Australian; one 
in four respondents expressed even high or extreme concern 
regarding inter-marriage: 'more than three times the rates of high 
concerns expressed for any other group, such as Aboriginal, Asian 
and Jewish Australians'.26 Interestingly, female respondents were 
significantly more likely to communicate such concerns, although all 
other attitudinal questions in the survey indicated a generally lower 
degree of racism and intolerance among women. These findings 
have been interpreted as an indicator that the 'stereotype of Islamic 
misogyny is an important component of the racialization of Islam in 
Australia', which functions as 'the core means by which Islam is 
constructed as a nefarious culture'. 27 
Calls for Assimilation and the Alleged Lack of Loyalty 
A common response of mainstream societies to the alleged incom-
patibility of Islam with Western values is calling upon Muslims to 
assimilate-a response even more pronounced in European societies 
than in Australia. While a small majority of 55 per cent of Australians 
want Muslims 'to change and blend into the wider Australian 
society28 ', assimilation urges are expressed by 80 to 90 per cent in 
many European countries.29 
While the content of these assimilation calls often remains 
blurry, a concrete request expressed in many countries refers to the 
public display of one's religion. According to the 2009 Gallup Global 
Study on Interfaith Relations, 42 and 40 per cent respectively of the 
The Vicious Cycle of Stereotyping: Muslims in Europe and Australia 179 
non-Muslim population in the UK and France consider it necessary 
for successful integration to be 'less expressive about one's religion'.3o 
A closer look at the mainstream society's attitudes to the Muslim 
headscarf and the full-face veil provides interesting insights: the 
French non-Muslim population (and also a relatively high percentage 
of Muslims themselves) more often consider it necessary for integra-
tion to remove Islamic as well as other religious symbols (for 
example, yarmulke, turbans) than their counterparts in the UK and 
Germany. The UK population appears to be more tolerant towards 
religious symbols in the integration process, with the exception of 
the Muslim face veil (Table 4). 
Table 4: Removing Religious Symbols Considered Necessary for 
Integration (in%) 
Headscarf Face veil Yarmulke Turban 
Non- 62 63 55 59 
France Muslims 
Muslims 22 32 23 23 
Non- 36 45 27 33 
Germany Muslims 
Muslims 6 29 10 11 
Non- 32 53 24 18 
UK Muslims 
Muslims 3 12 1 3 
Visible 
large 
crosses 
50 
24 
20 
11 
17 
2 
Source: Gallup, The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: Global Study on Interfaith Relations, 
Gallup: Washington D.C., pp. 21-2. 
Many Europeans question the intention of Muslims to adopt 
the country's customs and way of life and assume that Muslims seek 
to 'remain distinct from larger society'. This viewpoint is, according 
to the 2006 Pew study, shared by a majority of 76 per cent in Germany, 
around two-thirds in Spain and the UK, and 53 per cent in France. 31 
This insinuation is also related to the widespread assumption that 
Muslims lack loyalty to the country they live in. The 2009 Gallup 
study found that 49 per cent of the non-Muslim public in the UK and 
45 per cent in Germany do not think that Muslims are loyal to the 
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country they are living in (36 and 39 per cent respectively are of the 
opposite opinion). French respondents are slightly more likely to 
believe that Muslims are loyal to their 'new' home country (44 per 
cent). Asking Muslims in these countries the very same questions 
shows a different picture: the vast majority of Muslim respondents 
are convinced about their loyalty to the UK (92 per cent), France (80 
per cent) and Germany (71 per cent).32 
Islam as a Threat to Security and to 'Our' Way of Life 
Another dominant element of the public image of Islam and Muslims 
is related to the perceived threat posed by Muslims. The Australia-
wide Attitudes Towards Islam Survey (2003) gathered data on, among 
many other things, the extent and nature of community fear of Islam: 
41 per cent deemed Islam to be a minor threat and a further 15 per 
cent thought that Islam poses a major threat. Despite this high agree-
ment level, only a minority of the respondents were able to specify 
their worries: an indicator for 'a strong level of unsupported (and 
unsubstantiated) fear of Islam'.33 Those who did specify their worries 
(N: 176) mainly expressed concerns about military and security-
related threats, often referring to issues of terrorism. Cultural fears 
were mentioned less often (N: 76), primarily stating concerns about 
Islam trying to 'take over Australia'. 
According to the Australian IDA Survey, more than one-third 
of the respondents think that Muslims threaten the Australian way of 
life and its mainstream culture and values, while 51 per cent did not 
agree with this statement. Muslims living in Australia were regarded 
by almost half of the respondents as negatively affecting both the 
social fabric of Australia ('how people get along together') and 
Australia's national security. The most commonly stated reasons for 
these concerns were the perceived threats to democratic principles, 
the separation of church and state, to the Australian way of life and 
human rights and freedoms (for example, free speech, equal treat-
ment of women) as well as to Australia's safety and security. 34 Ten per 
cent of Australian respondents indicated that many or most Muslim 
Australians would support terrorism promoted by Islamic 
extremists. 35 
In Europe, the claim that Muslims in European countries 
sympathise with Islamic extremism seems to be even more 
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widespread. The 2006 Pew study showed that around one out of five 
respondents in the UK, France and Germany think that 'many or 
most' Muslims in the respective country 'support Islamic extremists 
like Al Qaeda'; in Spain, even 41 per cent agreed with this statement,36 
Moreover, between 30 per cent (France) and 42 per cent (UK) were 
'very concerned about Islamic extremism' in their respective home 
country.37 The abovementioned GFE survey also found strong suspi-
cions among the mainstream society that Muslims sympathise with 
terrorism: in the eight European countries under analysis, on average 
22 per cent agreed that the majority of Muslims justify Islamic 
terrorism.38 Although concerns about Muslims' support of Islamic 
extremism or terrorism appear to be more widespread in Europe, 
Europeans seem less worried than Australians about 'people with 
different religious practices' threatening the national way of life. 
According to the 2009 Gallup survey, only 11 per cent of respondents 
in France, 18 per cent of Germans and slightly more than a quarter of 
the British respondents perceived such a threat to the national way 
of life.39 
Despite some substantial nation-specific divergences in the 
public image of Islam and Muslims, the common denominator in 
Europe and Australia is the prevalence of negative attitudes towards 
Muslims-generated or further instigated by predominantly nega-
tive, distorted and biased media reporting40 and blatantly 
anti-Muslim or insensitive statements of politicians.41 These 
processes of collective labeling are suitable for sending out as a 
message to Muslim communities that they do not fully belong to 
society. According to social identity theories42, such labeling 
processes tend to generate artificial group boundaries which, once 
established, are subsequently reinforced as individuals tend to make 
more positive assessments of their own group members and devalue 
members of the out-groups with the aim of enhancing their own self-
image and self-esteem. Differences between members of the 
out-group ('the Muslims'), that is, its intra-group heterogeneity, are 
ignored, which increases the misperception of Islam as a monolithic 
religion. Such processes contribute to increasingly impermeable 
group boundaries between Muslims as 'the other43 ' and the non-
Muslim mainstream society, group-focused identities and mutual 
misperceptions. 
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2. Experiences of Discrimination 
Negative attitudes and prejudice towards minority groups do not 
only promote collective boundaries between Muslims and non-
Muslims but also increase the risk of discrimination against the 
members of the out-groups. Although there is no direct causal link 
between attitudes and behaviour (in other words, negative attitudes 
do not always lead to discrimination, discrimination is not always 
driven by prejudice), 'actions and attitudes are systematically 
related44 ' as collective resentments and individual prejudice entail an 
increased disposition to discrimination. The more widespread nega-
tive attitudes towards Muslims are, the more likely discrimination 
becomes-not only because a person with strong anti-Muslim preju-
dice is more prone to discriminate against Muslims (taste of 
discrimination theory45), but also due to the lower degree of social 
condemnation of, and sanctions for, unequal treatment of Muslims. 
Manifestations of discrimination range from rather subtle inci-
dents (for example, unfriendly treatment in shops), verbal insults 
and unequal treatment on the labour market (for example, rejection 
of job applicants) to threats, assaults and physical attacks. While 
unlawful discrimination in the access to employment, at the work-
place (for example, wages, promotions) or in the housing market can 
directly contribute to socio-economically more marginalised posi-
tions of Muslims46 , experiences of exclusion have also rather 
intangible effects by reinforcing feelings of alienation. Emphasising 
the significance of the personal perception of exclusion, the following 
paragraphs offer some empirical insights into this subjective dimen-
sion of discrimination against Muslims in Europe and Australia. 
Muslims' Experiences of Discrimination in European Countries 
In 2008, the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union 
(FRA) commissioned the representative European Union Minorities 
and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS) asking 23 500 immigrants 
and ethnic minorities across the EU about their everyday life experi-
ences of discrimination and victimisation. An EU-MIDIS subsample 
covering 14 countries focuses on those 9500 respondents who identi-
fied themselves as Muslims. 
On average 11 per cent of these Muslim interviewees stated 
they had been victims of racially motivated assault, threat or serious 
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harassment and 30 per cent reported experiences of discrimination 
(on average almost eight times per person) in the past twelve months. 
Muslims of Sub-Saharan African (43 per cent) and North African (36 
per cent) origin stated such experiences significantly more often 
than Muslims of Turkish (24 per cent), ex-Yugoslavian (14 per cent) 
or Iraqi (10 per cent) origin. The majority of them assumed that this 
happened due to both their ethnic or immigrant background and 
their religion; only 10 per cent are convinced that their Islamic reli-
gion was the sole reason for the maltreatment.47 Discrimination was 
commonly experienced when looking for a job or at the workplace, 
but also in the housing market, in the health sector, and at coffee 
shops, restaurants and nightclubs. Eight out of ten interviewees with 
discrimination experiences stated they had not reported the inci-
dent, arguing that 'nothing would change' or the incident was not 
worth reporting as 'it's normal and happens all the time'.48 
Table 5: Experiences of Discrimination: Muslim and 
Non-Muslim Youth (in%) 
France Spain 
Muslims Non- Muslim Non-
Muslims Muslims 
Experiences of 28 21 41 10 
discrimination 
Discrimination due to ... (multiple answers possible) 
Cultural 46 38 41 40 
background 
Religion 31 8 64 5 
Skin colour 26 28 11 19 
Language 13 5 25 21 
Others 39 52 21 43 
UK 
Muslims Non-
Muslims 
24 24 
36 18 
44 6 
45 22 
18 14 
13 75 
Source: FRA, Experiences of Discrimination, Social Marginalisation and Violence, p. 36. 
Another FRA study on experiences of discrimination targeted 
particularly Muslim and non-Muslim youth aged between twelve 
and eighteen in Spain, the UK and France. 49 In each country some 
1000 people were interviewed, 40 per cent of whom were Muslims. 
The results show that in France and Spain-but not in the 
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UK-Muslim teenagers experience significantly more discrimination 
(operationalised as being 'unfairly picked on or treated by others') 
than their non-Muslim counterparts, many of whom were also born 
abroad or had migrant parents. The reasons for being discriminated 
against were seen by the Muslim respondents as related primarily to 
their cultural background, their religion and skin colour (Table 5). 
Within the scope of the At Home in Europe project, the Open 
Society Institute (OSI) commissioned researchers to examine the 
situation of Muslims in eleven major European cities. In-depth inter-
views of 2200 residents (200 in each city) in neighbourhoods with a 
high Muslim population were conducted; half the respondents in 
each city were Muslims. The cross-country analysis showed that half 
of the Muslim interviewees had experienced religious discrimination 
in the previous twelve months either 'sometimes' (27 per cent), 'a lot 
of the time' (18 per cent) or 'almost all the time' (5 per cent); the other 
half felt discriminated against only rarely or not at all in this time 
period. The level of experienced ethnic discrimination was slightly 
lower, with 56 per cent having never or only rarely felt discriminated 
against in the past year. Religious discrimination is experienced more 
often in the general public sphere, including on public transport and 
by strangers (for example, on the street), than within certain institu-
tions or professional settings. 50 Of those Muslim respondents who 
have been refused a job in the past five years, some 15 per cent 
believe this was due to discrimination due to their ethnicity and 12 
per cent identified religious discrimination as the main reason for 
the rejection.51 
Muslims' Experiences of Discrimination and Victimisation 
in Australia 
Muslim Australians, too, experience a significant level of discrimina-
tion and victimisation due to their ethnic origin and religion. The 
Challenging Racism Project, surveying the general population in 2006 
(N: 4020), found that many respondents have experienced 'racist 
talk, exclusion and unfair treatment' as well as, to a lower degree, 
racist attacks. More than 20 per cent of the 1700 interviewees in 
Sydney, Melbourne and Perth experienced racist talk (for example, 
verbal abuse, name-calling, racist slurs), between 7 and 10.5 per cent 
reported experiences of unfair treatment due to their cultural 
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background (for example, denied service or employment) and 4.5 to 
6.5 per cent experienced racist attacks or threats. A closer look at the 
experiences of racist talk indicates that people of North African and 
Middle Eastern background experienced racist talk significantly 
more often than other minority groups, except for Indigenous 
Australians, and that such incidents occurred mainly in public spaces 
(43 per cent), but also at school (21 per cent) and at the workplace 
(14 per cent).52 
A questionnaire-based survey among 500 mainly religious 
Muslim Australians in Melbourne was carried out by a research team 
at Monash University in 2007, seeking to map their socio-economic 
situation, personal experiences and viewpoints. The data analysis 
revealed an ambiguous picture: the large majority of respondents 
expressed that they personally feel comfortable in Australian society 
(76 per cent), but almost nine in ten respondents (88 per cent) also 
sensed discrimination against Muslims in Australia. While this 
predominant 'sense of collective victimhood53 ' is not always based 
on individual experiences of discrimination, a still substantial 
majority of 56 per cent of the respondents stated that they had 
personally been discriminated against due to their race, ethnicity or 
religion in the previous two years. 
On behalf of the Australian Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC) within the scope of the Isma 
project (2003-2004), the Centre for Cultural Research at the 
University of Western Sydney conducted a questionnaire-based 
survey (and subsequent face-to-face interviews) among ethnic and 
religious minorities in order to examine their personal experiences of 
racism after September 11. The questionnaire was completed by 186 
people. More than 60 per cent of the respondents stated they had 
experienced 'racism, abuse or violence' on a monthly basis or more 
frequently since 11 September 2001. Muslim respondents were 
significantly more likely to report experiences of racism than 
Christians. Moreover, three in four Muslim respondents personally 
experienced more racism after September 11, and almost all of them 
observed, on a collective level, an increase in racism against their 
community. Sixty-seven per cent of Muslim respondents experienced 
racism on the streets, very often presumably caused by wearing a 
hijab. The media is, according to the respondents, the second-most 
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frequent context of experienced racism, followed by shops and malls, 
public transport and, to a lower degree, schools, workplaces and 
leisure sites. 54 
While the findings of the European and Australian studies 
presented here do not allow for a cross-country comparison on expe-
rienced discrimination due to the different methodological 
approaches and their often lacking representativeness, these 
research findings unanimously underscore the widespread experi-
ences of ethnic and/ or religious discrimination and victimisation of 
Muslims in Western societies. Various methodologically sound 
research studies have generated reliable evidence that these subjec-
tive experiences of discrimination do have an objective basis. One of 
the most convincing approaches to prove discrimination are 
matched-pair situation testings or audit studies. These research 
studies regularly show that Muslim migrants face particularly high 
discriminatory hurdles in the access to the labour market only 
because of their Muslim/Arabic sounding names.55 The following 
section will give some tentative empirical answers on the potential 
ramifications of such individual experiences of exclusions and 
discrimination. 
3. Implications of Stereotyping, Exclusion and Experiences 
of Discrimination 
One of the key questions here is whether experiences of marginalisa-
tion and discrimination contribute to alienation, self-segregation 
and an increased disposition to violence and radicalisation. Some 
empirical research has been undertaken in recent years that offers 
preliminarily insights into these questions. 
Relationship between Discrimination, Alienation and Violence 
The aforementioned FRA survey among Muslim and non-Muslim 
youngsters in Spain, France and the UK delivers empirical evidence 
that those who had experienced discrimination (regardless of their 
religious affiliation) are significantly more likely to feel socially alien-
ated, a mindset that encompasses feelings of mistrust and lacking 
control over one's own life. The study also discovered, similarly to 
previous research studies56, a strong relationship between victimisa-
tion and offending (that is, using violence): those who have been 
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actively involved in emotional (for example, teasing, bullying) or 
physical violence as perpetrators were also more likely to report that 
they had been victims of similar mistreatment. 57 
Whereas the respondents' religious background per se was no 
indicator for the engagement in violence, young people with strong 
feelings of alienation and victimisation due to their cultural or reli-
gious background, skin colour or language were 'highly likely to be 
involved in using emotional violence towards others'.513 Experiences 
of discrimination were an explanatory factor for the involvement in 
emotional violence in the French and British sample and also 
increased the likelihood of being engaged in physical violence among 
youngsters in Spain and France. Moreover, respondents in Spain and 
the UK who feel alienated were more likely to be involved in physical 
violence and so were British youngsters who felt victimised due to 
their cultural or religious origin. 
Mutual Reinforcement of Perceived Discrimination and Self-
segregation 
The German Youth Institute examined the association between 
'perceived discrimination and re-ethnicisation' of young people of 
Turkish background (N: 223) and young ethnic German repatriates 
from the former Soviet Union (Spiitaussiedler) (N: 263), using a 
subsample of a large-scale panel survey on the transition phase 
between high schoot vocational training and the labour market. The 
statistical analysis suggests that those who have failed to secure a 
position in the vocational training system or the labour market 
within the first year after their high school graduation are signifi-
cantly more likely to feel discriminated against. Among the 
youngsters of Turkish origin, these feelings of victimisation have a 
statistically significant reinforcing effect on their tendency to retreat 
into their ethnic groups (ethnic mobilisation). The findings also indi-
cate that these processes of re-ethnicisation and self-segregation 
subsequently reinforce both the sense of collective victimhood of 
one's ethnic group and feelings of being individually discriminated 
against. Hence, the research results confirm the mutually reinforcing 
association between individual perception of discrimination and 
self-segregation. 59 
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Anti-democratic Attitudes and Perceived Individual or Collective 
Discrimination 
The German Federal Ministry of the Interior commissioned a 
research team to examine the integration of Muslims in Germany, 
their experiences of discrimination and attitudes towards democratic 
values and the use of violence. Based on interview data, collected 
through a telephone survey among some 1000 Muslims in 2005, the 
researchers identified a very small group of Muslim respondents with 
particularly high anti-democratic attitudes and a rigid focus on 
Shari'a law. A multivariate data analysis60 showed that these Muslim 
respondents have either strongly experienced discrimination them -
selves or have a strong sense of collective discrimination. The study 
suggests that individual or collective victimisation increases the like-
lihood of showing anti-democratic attitudes, particularly among 
Muslims with strong orthodox religious orientations and tendencies 
of elevating Islam and devaluing other religions. st The study 
concluded that the proneness to radicalisation within Muslim 
communities can not be simply explained by certain (orthodox) reli-
gious orientations, but arises from a complex combination of factors, 
including the 'perception ... of collective marginalization of Muslims', 
disappointment with the mainstream society and 'limited opportu -
nities for participation' due to, among other reasons, individual 
discrimination. 62 
The findings presented here can not claim to fully disclose the 
mechanisms that drive this vicious cycle of Muslims' experiences of 
discrimination, alienation and self-segregation, but it offers prelimi-
nary indicators for the association between, and mutual 
reinforcement of, these destructive phenomena in Western societies. 
More targeted research is necessary to further investigate these 
complex mechanisms and their ramifications for multi-religious and 
multi-ethnic societies. 
4. Conclusion: Multiculturalism as a Remedy? 
On first sight, the empirical data presented here raise doubts that 
countries with a multicultural agenda fare generally better regarding 
the stereotypical representation of Islam and the level of exclusion 
and discrimination against Muslims. Thus, factors beyond the 
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national policies of managing diversity seem to play a (more) impor-
tant role in breaking-or reinforcing-the vicious cycle of exclusion 
and alienation. A closer look, however, suggests that multicultur-
alism may not be the only solution for these challenges in 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, but appears to be well 
suited for preparing the liberal, democratic foundation for cultural 
and religious accommodation, 'contributing to social cohesion rather 
than separatist dissension'. 63 
Diversity as a Societal Normality-or a Potential Threat 
The findings highlight that the actual level of religious diversity and 
the size of the Muslim population is not a very good predictor for the 
degree of anti-Muslim attitudes in a society. What seems to be a more 
plausible explanatory factor for the cross-country differences are the 
divergent national self-concepts with regards to the 'normality' of 
cultural and ethnic diversity as an integral characteristic of the 
society. In Germany, for example, an ethnically rather 'closed' 
concept of nationhood (ethnos) prevails, despite some significant 
political changes during the past decade. France and the UK, on the 
other hand, have a more inclusive and open notion of national iden -
tity (demo~4), either based on republican, colour-blind citizenship as 
in the case of France, or on liberalism and ethnic plurality like in the 
UK. This self-concept of being a diverse society often stems from the 
country's longstanding contacts with different ethnic or religious 
groups (for example, in those countries with a colonial past) or from 
its history as a country built by immigration, like, for example, in 
Australia, where a substantial majority of the population appreciates 
diversity and supports multiculturalism. 65 
This general appraisal of diversity tends to erode when fears of 
radicalism and terrorism emerge, fuelled by the media, political rhet-
oric and activism or actual terrorist attacks. This perception of Islam 
as a threat can be found in all European countries and Australia, but 
it seems more pronounced in the UK, where the formerly rather 
relaxed attitudes towards religions have yielded to more sceptical 
and critical viewpoints-a finding that points to the collective 
trauma in the wake of the 717 London bombing and the subsequent 
debates on 'home-grown' terrorism. 
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The National Way of Life: Inclusive Invitation or Closed Club? 
In Europe, and to a lesser degree also in Australia, Muslims (and 
immigrants in general) are called upon to blend into the society and 
adopt the national way of life. What sounds like a strong cross-
country convergence can in effect differ profoundly depending on 
how this way of life is defined in the national context. 
France applies a strictly republican understanding: every 
citizen, regardless of ethnicity or religion, shall enjoy the French egal-
itarian values of liberte, egalite and fraterniti-on condition of their 
loyalty to the new home country and commitment to its republican 
traditions. In this sense France has 'set clear and equal terms of inte-
gration' and 'Muslims have understood and accepted these terms'. 66 
Due to the traditionally strict secularism, all religions are expected to 
be kept separate from the public sphere. This political way of life 
seems to provide a comparatively accessible and open platform for 
Muslims to identify with French society, at least in principle. Findings 
from opinion polls support this interpretation: according to the 2006 
Pew survey; almost eight in ten Muslim respondents in France think 
that Muslims want to adopt the national way of life-the highest rate 
of all surveyed countries (UK: 41 per cent, Germany: 30 per cent).67 
Germany's self-conception of its national way of life stands in 
contrast to the above. Immigrants are generally not only expected to 
learn German, comply with the law and respect constitutional values 
and fundamental rights, but also to accept the German Leitkultur 
('leading culture'). This rather blurry term, which was introduced 
into the integration debate in 2000, conceptualises the German way 
of life as an ill-defined set of norms and customs based on the coun-
try's alleged Christian-occidental tradition and values of humanism. 
In combination with the Germany's abovementioned ethnos-based 
concept of nationhood, this German Leitkultur is highly exclu-
sionary-in particular for Muslims. Given this 'closed club' sense of 
nationhood, it is not surprising that Germany is the country with the 
highest scores on the Islamophobia scale across Europe. 
In contrast, the self-assigned way of life in multicultural 
Australia encompasses, in addition to a commitment to fundamental 
freedoms and dignity, a strong sense of fairness and equal opportu-
nities-everyone deserves a fair go. Religion and ethnicity appear to 
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be hardly important, as opinion polls have shown. Asked about 
desired characteristics of new immigrants, 'Australians appear to put 
less emphasis on incoming immigrants being ... white than other 
countries'.68 A Christian background is considered important only by 
around 15 per cent. 
Socio-economic Inclusion and Personal Interaction 
In all countries under study, Muslims disproportionally occupy 
socio-economically disadvantageous positions as a result of, among 
other factors, discriminatory barriers in the employment sector. This 
socially marginalised situation contributes to feelings of non-
belonging and reinforces a 'sense of blocked progress' and 
frustration69, which may trigger outbursts of violence and civic unrest 
as seen in Northern English cities in 2001 and in French banlieues in 
2005 and 2007. Thus, the integration of Muslims is (like for any other 
group) strongly influenced by comprehensive labour market, anti-
discrimination and general social policies. 
The socio-economic situation and chances of upward mobility 
do not only foster participation in society, but also positively deter-
mine the opportunity structure for personal interaction or 
friendships between Muslims and non-Muslims, which seems to be 
one of the best remedies against mutual misperceptions and nega-
tive stereotyping, as research studies have highlighted. 70 
What Does Multiculturalism Have to Offer? 
Multiculturalism, in combination with effective social and labour 
market policies, appears to be a particularly suitable policy frame-
work to accommodate cultural and religious diversity. Multicultural 
policies emphasise that cultural, ethnic and religious diversity is an 
essential and enriching characteristic of the society and recognise 
the respect of all cultures and religions. This is the positive signal 
sent out by multiculturalism. Moreover, the notion of equality, 
regardless of one's ethnic, cultural or religious background, is under-
scored as a basic principle in the inclusion and civic citizenship of 
Muslims and other minorities. 
Multicultural policies have another, possibly decisive advantage 
in redressing the vicious cycle of stereotyping and exclusion of 
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Muslims-an advantage that has also been described by critical 
commentators as its biggest pitfall. While 'placing paramount impor-
tance ... on the individuaF1', multiculturalism also highlights cultural 
group membership, acknowledging the legitimacy of group affilia-
tions and related claims. Geoffrey Levey argues that 'it is hard to see 
why cultural [or religious] minorities should be debarred from 
pursuing their particular interests when interest group politics is the 
stuff of contemporary liberal democratic politics'. 72 Instead of 
ignoring these attachments to cultural or religious groups, multicul-
turalism gives voice to Muslim communities, more than 
assimilationist policy models do, and encourages Muslims to engage 
in the public debate and actively participate in the discourse on 
Islam in the West. 'The group begins to speak for itself, not just in 
terms of positivity but also about its pain', as Modood put it. 73 
This public engagement of Muslims in multicultural societies 
holds two important positive prospects in breaking the vicious cycle 
of stereotyping and exclusion. On the one hand, Muslims can express 
their own experiences of Islamophobia and exclusion in their 
national language, as active citizens of the society. By doing so, they 
discredit Islamophobic insinuations that accuse Muslims of not 
fitting in and of being unwilling to participate in mainstream society. 
On the other hand, the public engagement of (moderate) Muslim 
leaders challenges extremist and isolationist tendencies within small 
niches of the Muslim communities, which argue (paradoxically 
similar to their Islamophobic counterparts) against the compatibility 
of Islam and Western values and accuse the West of being keen on 
erasing the Muslim faith and Islamic cultures. A strong public 
commitment of moderate Muslim leaders can help redress these 
misperceptions among small Muslim groups and tackle extremist 
and self-segregationist tendencies from within the communities. 
Multiculturalism may not be the only remedy and sole response 
to the challenges posed by the ongoing cultural and religious diversi-
fication ofWestern societies, but it provides a pragmatic and effective 
policy framework to deal with this diversity and to resolve the diffi-
culties that arise from it without sacrificing social cohesion or 
fundamental freedoms and human rights. 
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